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Abstract
In this perspectives piece, an interdisciplinary team of social science researchers considers the 
implications of Covid-19 for the politics of sustainable energy transitions. The emergency 
measures adopted by states, firms, and individuals in response to this global health crisis have 
driven a series of political, economic and social changes with potential to influence sustainable 
energy transitions. We identify some of the initial impacts of the ‘great lockdown’ on 
sustainable and fossil sources of energy, and consider how economic stimulus packages and 
social practices in the wake of the pandemic are likely to shape energy demand, the carbon-
intensity of the energy system, and the speed of transitions. Adopting a broad multi-scalar and 
multi-actor approach to the analysis of energy system change, we highlight continuities and 
discontinuities with pre-pandemic trends. Discussion focuses on four key themes that shape 
the politics of sustainable energy transitions: (i) the short, medium and long-term temporalities 
of energy system change; (ii) practices of investment around clean-tech and divestment from 
fossil fuels; (iii) structures and scales of energy governance; and (iv) social practices around 
mobility, work and public health. While the effects of the pandemic continue to unfold, some 
of its sectoral and geographically differentiated impacts are already emerging. We conclude 
that the politics of sustainable energy transitions are now at a critical juncture, in which the 
form and direction of state support for post-pandemic economic recovery will be key.
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Covid-19 and the Politics of Sustainable Energy Transitions
1. Introduction
Covid-19 is, above all, a global health crisis with devastating implications for a great many as 
people lose their lives and as we live through an array of direct and indirect effects of lockdown 
and social distancing measures. This perspectives piece is written at a time when the pandemic 
is still unfolding, but some of its dramatic and varied impacts on the global economy, energy 
and financial markets, governance, and our ways of living are already evident. Our purpose 
here is to explore how the changes wrought by the pandemic might influence the complex and 
dynamic politics of sustainable energy transitions. This question is particularly pertinent now, 
as governments, companies, and wider publics consider what the pandemic means, how to 
respond and, importantly, the extent to which responses should be ‘green’.
There had been some positive trends in the politics of sustainable energy transitions, as 
broadly defined below, in the years running up to the outbreak of the pandemic. For example, 
the Paris Agreement instituted nationally determined climate goals; sustainability transitions 
were placed on the agendas of many local, national and global governing bodies; the cost of 
renewable energy continued to fall rapidly, making it an increasingly politically and 
economically viable option; divestment campaigns were taking off; and there was a surge in 
public buy-into the argument that urgent action was required to address climate change. The 
hope was that COP-26, due to take place in Glasgow in November 2020, would see increased 
ambition to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Meanwhile, however, global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions continued to rise rather than fall, albeit not in 2019 [1], and there remains 
a considerable emissions gap between the paths we are on and where we need to be [2].
Early reports of the economic impact of the pandemic, and the ‘Great Lockdown’, are 
bleak: the global economy is predicted to shrink by 6% in 2020, with the possibility that 300 
million people lose their jobs [3]. There will, however, be significant variance in impacts with 
some sectors and countries harder hit, and some recovering more quickly than others. 
Predictions are that the open, service-oriented economies that dominate the OECD are likely 
to suffer more for longer [4], whilst China’s economy is already showing strong signs of 
recovery. Equally, those economies already carrying significant debt and/or a reliance on fossil 
fuel exports are also likely to be harder hit. 
In April 2020, almost 54% of the global population were subject to complete or partial 
lockdowns and, as such, the share of energy use that was exposed to containment measures 
reached 50% [5]. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the early implications of Covid-19 were also 
significant but varied for emissions, fossil fuel and sustainable energy. Daily global CO2 
emissions fell by 17% in April 2020, compared to April 2019, with just under half this 
reduction coming from surface transport as social practices changed [6][7], and expectations 
are of an overall 8% drop in 2020 taking emissions to levels of 10 years ago [5]. Lower 
emissions are connected, in turn, to energy use: demand for, and prices of, fossil fuels and 
electricity fell quite dramatically. The biggest drop was for oil, which saw a 25% fall in April 
2020, with US oil prices falling negative for a period of time [5]. Renewable demand was, 
however, less affected and is expected to rise overall, by 1%, in 2020. As a result, the share of 
renewables within the overall energy mix may jump several years ahead of pre-pandemic 
expectations [5]. 
The debate has, however, already started to turn to what kind of recovery, in 
sustainability terms, we can expect. There is considerable concern that, as with the post-2008 
recovery, there will be a rapid return to high levels of emissions and urban air pollution, and 
severe inequalities in terms of social outcomes. By May 2020 air pollutant levels in China had 
already over-shot their pre-crisis levels [8], whilst it is evident that a green recovery is not a 
luxury that all can afford and short-term survival strategies, that support business-as-usual, are 
underway in many parts of the world. At the same time, however, many are arguing forcefully 
that sizeable global stimulus packages provide an historic opportunity to drive sustainable 
energy transitions whilst, at the same time, delivering positive societal outcomes such as jobs, 
green growth and equity [3]. 
As such, the economic and social impacts of Covid-19 will do much to shape the 
politics of sustainable energy transitions over the next few years. We structure our discussions 
below around how important trends emerging in four thematic areas: energy system change; 
finance and investment; multi-scalar governance; and social practices, might be affected by 
Covid-19. Whist we recognise limitations in reaching conclusions at a time of rapid change 
and uncertainty, indications so far are that the pandemic overall is likely to be continuous with, 
and to accelerate, many of these trends. Our emphasis on the politics of transitions tends to 
foreground the notion that policy decisions taken as we emerge out of lockdown and into 
prolonged periods of social distancing will be vital to the success of sustainable energy 
transitions.
2. Defining the Politics of Sustainable Energy Transitions 
It is important, before we proceed, to provide some key definitions. Sustainable energy 
transitions are conceived here as complex socio-technical processes of decarbonisation within 
energy systems, and involve both bringing in low, or zero, carbon energy and phasing out old, 
high carbon energy [9]. Our understanding of sustainable also includes due consideration for 
social issues of energy poverty, equity and justice. In turn, energy systems, old and new, are 
understood as being made up not just of supply, but also demand and social infrastructures 
[10]. Energy systems and practices are, of course, already undergoing sustainable changes, in 
particular in electricity, whilst there is significant variety between countries, in terms of pace, 
scale and technologies [11], partly related to political approaches to sustainability. 
Politics is broadly understood here as consisting of power relations, formal and 
informal political processes, and their outcomes. Energy politics is increasingly multi-scalar 
in that it involves a growing multiplicity of actors at global, national and sub-national scales 
[10] [12], a theme to which we return below. Sustainable energy transitions and politics are 
deeply intertwined: politics can shape the nature of energy systems, i.e. the degree to which 
they become sustainable, but politics is also, in turn, affected by energy systems [12] [13]. This 
observation informs our choice of energy system change as one of our themes. Sustainable 
energy policy is, in turn, shaped by embedded power relations and institutions, but exists today 
because of the successful articulation of new ideas, particularly about climate change [10] [12]. 
Within our definition, energy power relations also include institutionalised financial practices, 
and investment choices, that have long facilitated fossil fuel lock-in in energy systems [11], to 
which we return in Section 3.2 below.  
Lastly, as part of our multi-actor view of the politics of sustainable energy transitions 
we consider social practices, and the role of the public, to be of paramount importance: as 
voters, particularly within democracies; as participants in political movements; and as 
consumers and, increasingly, generators of energy [6] [14]. Indeed, habits, norms and culture, 
can be considered both a constituent element of existing energy systems [10], as well as a key 
aspect of how systems can change given the right political conditions [15]. This aspect of the 
politics of sustainable energy becomes particularly relevant given that lockdown led to, more 
or less temporary, new social practices.
Partly for these reasons, but also because of wider socio-technical lock-ins [16], 
sustainable energy transitions have frequently required conscious efforts by public actors to 
steer towards a more sustainable path. The nature of policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic 
emerge as key given that these have the potential to speed up or slow down sustainable energy 
transitions [3] [17] [18]. Or, put more dramatically, to determine whether or not political 
pandemic responses prevent the world from leaping from the Covid-19 frying pan into the 
climate fire [17]. Equally it is important to consider whether Covid-19 has the potential to 
change the politics of energy and, if so, in what ways. We approach these questions by 
identifying continuities and discontinuities with sustainable energy politics trends, outlined 
above and below, and by thinking in terms of whether these trends are accelerating or 
decelerating. This is what we turn to next.
3. The Politics of Sustainable Energy Transitions under Covid-19
The below is clearly not intended as an exhaustive discussion of all possible implications of 
Covid-19 for the politics of sustainable energy. The thematic areas that shape the discussion 
tie in with our understanding of the politics of sustainable energy transitions outlined above, 
and are further informed by emerging analyses of the effects of the pandemic and related 
debates. What this represents is an early attempt at analysing complex politics at a time of 
ongoing change and uncertainty, with some emphasis on the OECD countries.
3.1 Energy System Change
Questions of acceleration and deceleration highlight the importance of time frames, and the 
analysis below is sensitive to the temporalities of Covid-19: i.e. in some parts of the world, the 
short-term, defined as the period of lockdown, is over; whilst the medium-term can be defined 
as the period over which social distancing and recovery take place; and the longer term, mid 
2020s to 2030, where the consequences of decisions made now will be most apparent [18]. 
What’s key in this thematic area is the impact of the pandemic on the pace and nature of whole 
energy system change, an issue that was already the subject of considerable debate [19], on the 
growth of the low carbon energy system, and the looming demise of the incumbent fossil-fuel 
based system [20]. 
Historical price crashes and demand shocks left indelible marks on the evolution of the 
global energy system, and the current crisis is no different. The counterfactual when 
considering implications for whole energy systems is to consider what the structure of the 
global energy system might have been in 2030 had there not been a pandemic.
The short-term impact is clear: an unprecedented fall in energy demand, especially for 
oil, along with a more modest, but still significant, decline in electricity demand and prices.1 
After the March 2020 oil price war, OPEC+ reached an agreement, that was subsequently 
supported by the G20, to reduce global oil production, but, as is always the case with such 
deals, the final outcome will only be perceptible later on. The initial impact on natural gas 
demand was more muted, but global production of liquefied natural gas was constrained by a 
lack of demand and the future is increasingly uncertain [21]. Coal demand in China was hit 
early by falls in industrial output and electricity demand, both have swiftly rebounded in China, 
but remained constrained elsewhere [5]. Natural gas and coal demand are both linked to power 
generation, the relative impact there was related to the extent and duration of the ‘lockdown’, 
and its varied impact on industrial activity, and this complicates matters in relation to coal, 
domestic gas and electricity demand [22].
Renewable power generation has fared relatively well, particularly in those markets 
where capacity is already significant, and it tops the merit order. At the same time, the 
pandemic has impacted on the operation of energy installations, such as offshore wind 
platforms, and also slowed the construction of new production facilities and infrastructure. 
First, because construction activity was hindered by new safety measures and second because 
the breakdown in international trade disrupted supply chains [23]. Indeed, the IEA, forecasts 
approximately 13% less growth in 2020 than in 2019, with growth rebounding in 2021 which 
is a discontinuity with pre-pandemic trends, albeit the growth of renewables as a percent of the 
overall mix is continuous with longer-term trends [24].
The pandemic has also exposed the vulnerabilities of relying on international supply 
chains for vital healthcare products and appliances, and the energy industry has been affected 
here too. For renewables and batteries, government-ordained work stoppages and border and 
port closures have also led to a disruption of trade in materials, components and assembled 
goods [25]. As the reliability of global supply chains can no longer be taken for granted, 
governments and corporations are considering ‘re-shoring’ essential and strategic industries, 
which typically includes the energy sector. As such, the pandemic might accelerate an ongoing 
trend of ‘de-globalization’ and the re-shoring of critical energy industries, especially those in 
which China has obtained a pivotal position in the supply chain and production line. Covid-19 
1 Electricity prices in Europe had already been falling as a result of increased renewable capacity so the 
pandemic impact, again, tends to amplify existing trends.
has also underscored the need to closely monitor security of supply for certain minerals that 
are essential for the energy transition, including cobalt, nickel and copper [26]. 
In the medium term we will need to closely watch recovery programmes and the degree 
to which struggling fossil fuel companies are supported, and whether there are any 
decarbonisation conditions. And the struggle is apparent: already, many energy companies 
have slashed their investment plans, final investment decisions (FIDs) have been delayed and 
the longer-term prospects for new production are threatened, though not everywhere. The IEA 
estimates that total energy investment will fall by 20% in 2020 [27]. The LNG industry is 
instructive with FIDs delayed in North America and Mozambique, whilst prospects in the 
Eastern Mediterranean now seem bleak, although Qatar is going ahead with its expansion. As 
such, whether or not fossil fuel producing states decide to support their ailing producers is a 
critical factor in determining the medium-term oil, gas and coal outcome. The plight of the 
shale industry in the US is also instructive: the rig count has plummeted, production is falling, 
and bankruptcies are rising. Just as in 2014–15, the US shale industry will survive, but 
production will probably never return to its 2019–20 peak [28]. This will take the shine off US 
‘energy dominance’ with potentially wide-ranging geopolitical consequences. 
Although it is still early days, companies invested in renewable energy are more 
optimistic about their future, but it remains to be seen whether international oil companies 
(IOCs), such as BP, Shell and Total, will accelerate their diversification into ‘new energy’ as 
they grapple with the loss of fossil fuel revenue. Much also depends on the pace and scale of 
demand recovery, but there are those who argue that 2019 might turn out to be the date of 
global peak fossil fuel demand [29], and, as such, in hindsight Covid-19 may be viewed as 
having accelerated the demise of fossil fuels. 
The long-term outlook will be shaped by the pace of economic recovery and the degree 
to which the trillions of dollars of government stimulus support fossil-fuel incumbents and to 
which they accelerate clean energy production and demand side management. Equally, reduced 
electricity demand growth may weaken the appetite for new coal power in emerging 
economies. The sentiment of the financial sector is also a critical factor here, and, see below, 
accelerated fossil fuels divestment seems one likely outcome [17]. The medium-term cuts in 
investment in production, discussed above, may result in high oil and gas prices and volatility 
in the second half of the decade, although BP have revised their long-term oil price outlook, 
and announced a USD 13bn to 17.5bn write-off [30]. 
However, it is worth remembering that over 80% of states are not net fossil fuel 
exporters. The very prospect of future high oil and gas prices may accelerate the transition 
away from such fuels; and fossil-fuel demand destruction would gather pace, which would 
constrain prices. Thus, we can conclude that, for most states, investing in the low-carbon 
transition is a win-win strategy that both stimulates economic recovery and reduces the cost of 
future fossil-fuel imports. 
3.2 Finance and Investment
An historically intransigent aspect of sustainable energy transitions has been the financial 
practices that have heretofore supported fossil fuel industries, as well as the financial power of 
many incumbent actors. Transnational, and national, oil and gas companies have kept up 
investments in long-term projects; coal investments, often by Japan and China, have continued 
in developing countries thereby underpinning the expansion of coal fired electricity; whilst 
state subsidies for fossil fuels continue to far outstrip support for sustainable energy [31]. Prior 
to this crisis, and the implications for fossil fuel companies listed above, these investment 
practices were partly responsible for locking-in difficulties associated with phasing out fossil 
fuels [11].
Over the past few years, however, there have been growing moves to divest away from 
fossil fuels by increasingly high profile private and quasi-state actors in many OECD countries. 
There is also growing recognition of financial risks associated with continued fossil fuel 
investment, as well as re-evaluations of fossil fuel reserves associated with concerns about 
stranded assets. Lastly, energy policy has played a strong role in, directly or indirectly, 
supporting investment in renewables, energy efficiency, grid improvements, and storage – 
albeit investment levels remain too low [32]. 
Evidence thus far suggests that the implications of Covid-19 may accelerate some of 
these more recent trends. The stronger demand and price performance of green energy 
compared to fossil fuels through the crisis is a core aspect of expected longer-term sustainable 
energy transitions [9]. This potential for relatively improved financial returns for green versus 
brown energy is further underpinned by recent analysis showing superior investment returns 
from renewable versus fossil fuel shares since the pandemic, and indeed over the past 5 years 
[32]. We have already seen, above, that low oil and gas demand and prices have resulted in 
falling investment in, especially, US shale but also a range of other petroleum provinces. There 
is also, however, and this is more of a discontinuity with existing trends, potential for a fall in 
investment flows into coal plants as economic growth in emerging economies weakens [20].
It is also important to also think about who is investing at the moment given that so 
many national governments, and some international actors, are currently implementing, and 
devising, significant rescue and stimulus packages which might offer an historic chance for 
sustainable investment [33]. Indeed, the IEA has already pointed out that 70% of funds invested 
in energy come, directly or indirectly, from the state [33], and that governments, globally, are 
planning to spend USD 9tn in the next months on recovery packages [3]. Thurs far, short-term 
government spend has been focused on reacting to the health challenge and protecting 
livelihoods, jobs and businesses and, as such, tends to support ‘business-as-usual’ [35]. Indeed, 
a point of comparison regularly made is with the recovery process post 2008 which, given 
limited green stimulus, returned the world quite quickly to an upward trajectory of emissions 
[5], [17], [36].
There is more hope, however, this time around, of medium and longer-term stimulus 
packages leading to green outcomes. Significant cleantech market progress [37], mainly in 
efficiency and electricity sectors, means that ‘business-as-usual’ in energy is now greener than 
in 2008 for a lot of countries. What can be inferred from this is that, for those countries that 
have strong and/or growing cleantech sectors, focusing investments on green energy may well 
mean effective short- and medium-term stimulus. Hepburn et al [17], argue that green 
investments, for example in energy efficiency building retrofits, renewables, and clean energy 
infrastructure, can be delivered quickly and have high economic and jobs multipliers, see also 
[38], [39]. Indeed, relative fossil fuel and sustainable energy share performances and the 
longer-term demand outlook for oil and coal provides more evidence to support the argument 
that sustainable initiatives offer superior economic returns for government spending [17], as 
well as contributing towards longer term resilience and national emissions targets.
Although the evidence base for green stimulus is much stronger this time around, it is 
not yet clear whether, or to which extent, policymakers in OECD countries will choose that 
path. What is clear is the emergence of high-profile, and widely disseminated, arguments that 
state actions in this time period are crucial to a recovery that supports, and perhaps even 
accelerates, sustainable energy transitions [3] [17] [40]. It is also worth noting that there will 
be significant variety in whether countries pursue green stimulus, partly in relation their 
existing commitments to sustainable energy, and how financially embedded clean and fossil 
fuel energy sectors are.
3.3 Multi-scalar Policy and Politics
Sustainable energy transitions have played out against an historical backdrop of globalisation 
– in the sense of increasing interdependence of energy systems, global supply chains, and 
energy-associated externalities – albeit more recent trends, exacerbated by the pandemic, have 
been towards ‘re-shoring’. Yet, there has been a general lack of coordinated and inclusive 
global energy governance that spans across all actors and sectors. The historically dominant 
global governance institutions typically consist of either producer or consumer clubs, and they 
tend to be preoccupied with energy security (of supply or demand) rather than with 
decarbonization per se [41].
The last decade, however, has seen major innovations in intergovernmental 
governance, notably the creation of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 
2009, the adoption of UN Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement. The latter, 
in particular, now requires most national governments to devise and regularly update their 
climate pledges, the so-called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While this has 
prompted countries like the UK and regions like the EU to adopt or propose net zero emission 
targets by the middle of the century, other major players, most significantly the United States, 
have backtracked at the national level. Even within the EU there are divisions: most western 
EU member states have embraced the energy transition as a means to green and diversify their 
energy supply, and as an industrial opportunity, whilst many eastern EU members are more 
reluctant, for example Poland is opting to secure jobs in coal [54]. In this sense, the world in 
general and the EU in particular face a multi-speed energy transition.
The Paris Agreement has, importantly, both underpinned the notion of sub-national and 
non-state action and galvanized new actors, including cities, civil society groups, investors, 
transnational movements and corporations. Overall, one could say that the site of sustainable 
energy governance has been gravitating away from multilateral diplomacy and across national, 
transnational and local scales [42]. This dynamic was explicitly supported by the Paris 
Agreement which, in starting from nationally determined pledges, took an explicitly more 
bottom-up approach. As things stand, however, policies and regulatory frameworks in almost 
every country are insufficient in terms of reaching the new emissions targets [2].
Such was the state of affairs when Covid-19 struck. The pandemic will have multiple 
implications for multi-scalar energy governance. One immediate consequence is that the 
COP26 climate summit, which was planned to take place in November 2020 in Glasgow, has 
been postponed by a year. This raises the possibility that the US is represented at the COP by 
a new administration with a more positive climate stance, depending on the outcome of the 
upcoming US elections. More broadly, the response of governments to the Covid-19 crisis thus 
far seems to bode ill for the system of multilateral cooperation. Regional and international 
organizations from the EU to the UN have struggled to muster a coordinated response to the 
pandemic, the US has announced its withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO), 
and geopolitical tensions between China and the United States have escalated. The frailty of 
the current system of global cooperation might reinforce the decentralization of energy 
governance from the multilateral to national, transnational and local scales marking some 
continuity with direction of travel in governance. It will also be interesting to see in this regard 
whether, for example, Covid-19 exacerbates or diminishes the aforementioned differences in 
speed and enthusiasm with which the EU member states pursue the energy transition and how 
the European Commission will cope with that.
Another impact of Covid-19 on the multi-scalar nature of sustainable energy 
governance is that the role of national governments has been stepped up, markedly in many 
places, in order to respond to the pandemic [3], [17]. Indeed, the pandemic has led to levels of 
government intervention in markets and private life not seen in many decades and, as such, 
marks some discontinuity with longer term trends. The effectiveness of government 
intervention, however, will partly depend on their economic and institutional capacities [43], 
which may be stretched thin as a result of the unprecedented responses required so far to Covid-
19. At the same time, there is also evidence of cities around the world responding quite rapidly, 
often by changing transport modes and enabling distancing while travelling [20], [40], [44], 
sometimes even as national governments take a different course. Again, this appears to be an 
acceleration of the pre-Covid-19 trend of greater multi-scalarity in how energy is governed, as 
the pandemic so far shows signs of re-localizing and re-calibrating places and spaces of energy 
governance.
3.4 Social & Political Practices
Clearly, how different social groups are affected by sustainable transitions differs markedly 
between and within countries. Those employed within fossil fuel industries may feel very 
differently from those living within regions at high risk from rising sea levels – hence recent 
calls to adjust for such inequalities when governing for sustainable energy transitions [11]. 
Within many OECD countries, however, in the years immediately preceding Covid-19, 
public support for action on climate change was at an all-time high [17], [18]. For example, 
mass transnational movements, like Extinction Rebellion and the Youth Climate Movement, 
took a considerable step up in the late 2010s, whilst opinion polls showed increasing levels of 
concern about climate change as well as support for solutions, like renewables. Reports, in 
particular IPCC 1.5 degrees [45], provided a far clearer picture of the human and social 
implications of not mitigating, whilst more publicly visible, physical evidence of climate 
change had also been mounting. All of which led to a consensus in many OECD countries that 
the 2020s are vital for action to mitigate.
At the time of writing, June 2020, much of society is understandably focused on human 
security, improved health, protection of jobs and incomes, and economic recovery. Those 
working in high carbon and clean energy industries will seek support as part of recovery 
packages. Arguably, however, pre-Covid-19 surges in support for climate action as well as how 
attitudes evolve during the pandemic will be important considerations for policymakers as they 
make decisions about what priority they give to green stimulus, and to developing much needed 
new sustainable policies over the medium term.
This, in turn, raises the relevance of debates in the public sphere, across newspapers, 
social media and civil society, on what a post-Covid-19 world will look like – i.e. the ‘new 
normal’. One of the key outcomes of lock-down and ongoing social distancing has been 
considerable, albeit partly non-voluntary, changes in social practices – including in mobility 
and work practices [7]. Transport has been one of the hardest hit sectors, especially air, rail, 
car and bus travel, as people have stayed home. By contrast, in many countries walking and 
cycling has proven the obvious travel replacement for shorter journeys [7], [46]. As we have 
seen, these practice changes have had clear implications for oil demand, whilst reduced high 
carbon travel has been a major contributor to Covid-19 related emissions reductions. The key 
question here is whether social practice changes persist firstly beyond lock-down, and then 
through social distancing phases – i.e. staying with the example of transport, will demand for 
transport overall be lower longer term, and how will transport choices differ?
There are various clues that we can consider in relation to this question. Firstly, in terms 
of preferred modes of transport, some national and many local governments, as mentioned 
above, have announced new policies aimed at structurally reinforcing moves towards cycling 
and walking within cities. Conversely, with relevance for longer journeys, social distancing 
lowers demand for public transport, which may mean a switch to more car journeys for those 
that have that choice. At the same time, however, although car sales have fallen dramatically, 
and car companies are amongst those clamouring for government support, electric vehicle sales 
are still up globally [47]. 
Secondly, lockdown has provided new evidence about the effectiveness of working 
from home, not least due to the time saved from not having to commute [3], [7]. Because social 
distancing also affects people’s willingness to return to work, and some workplaces may not 
have sufficient space, the duration of social distancing is a key variable in determining longer 
term travel demand. This is also because, as some sociologists have noted [7], the longer the 
time period over which people are compelled to change practices the more likely some 
behavioural changes become new norms or habits. In sum, in terms of the carbon content of 
travel, Covid-19 appears so far to be continuous with and accelerated existing trends, like 
cycling and working from home, but may present some difficulties in the medium-term for 
policies encouraging public transport as an alternative to cars.
Lastly, when thinking about public responses to the pandemic, there is evidence emerging 
that Covid-19 has demonstrated, in more vivid terms, links between human activity, 
biodiversity loss, environmental degradation and health [48]. Air pollution was already 
climbing up political agendas in many parts of the world and the WHO estimates that annually 
4.2 million deaths result from exposure to outdoor air pollution [49]. Now it has also become 
a key focus within the pandemic. Various studies linking Covid-19 deaths with air pollution 
have been widely circulated, including comments from the WHO that if you are exposed to air 
pollution your chances of being severely affected are much higher [50], [51]. 
At the same time, it has not gone unnoticed that air pollution has dropped significantly and, 
in the case of China, started to rise again as lockdown eases. Indeed, a recent IPSOS Mori poll, 
undertaken in Europe, shows not only that people have noticed the clean air, but that they are 
now asking policymakers to refocus on wellbeing over other indicators such as GDP [7]. 
Indeed, Covid-19, like climate change, was no ‘black swan’ event – there have been several 
warnings of a pandemic of this nature [52], [53]. What Covid-19 has more widely 
demonstrated, therefore, is the devastating consequences of ignoring such warnings, thereby 
offering some potential to argue for an accelerated shift in political focus onto long-term 
measures of broad resilience, and away from short-term gains.
4. Conclusions 
It is clear that the pandemic occurred at a critical juncture in terms of the relationship between 
politics and sustainable energy transitions. State support and policy intervention has been key 
to promoting efficiency and accelerating decarbonisation of the energy system, particularly in 
a just manner; now the need for the state to invest to support post-pandemic economic recovery 
presents an opportunity to energise green growth. 
Many of the main drivers of what happens next represent a continuation of processes 
that pre-date the pandemic. A key question that has emerged here is whether or not there will 
be an acceleration of trends towards a more sustainable future, or whether the desire to protect 
existing jobs and incumbent industry will retard the momentum that was emerging in some 
countries under the banner of a ‘green new deal’ or ‘green growth’. One lesson from the 2008 
crisis was that, when it comes to emissions, a rebound to the ways of old is as likely as not. 
However, this perspectives piece has found good reasons to think that this time might be 
somewhat different.
Given relative economic performances between fossil fuels and sustainable energy 
during the pandemic, there appears to be a greater chance of green stimulus this time around. 
Much also depends on whether changes imposed in the lockdown result in longer term 
behavioural and structural change in relation to issues like fossil fuel demand, air quality, and 
support for climate change mitigation. New global accords now exist, in the form of the Paris 
Agreement and the UN’s 2030 Agenda and associated SDGs, that provide targets and direction 
for politicians and policy makers to strive towards and, importantly, against which increasingly 
active publics can hold them to account. Furthermore, the Covid-19 crisis has explicitly 
exposed a lack of political response to warnings of human disaster and of resilience in public 
health and welfare, which provides further support for arguments that a post-pandemic world 
should not be politics, or indeed business, as usual. 
Rising diversity and inequality, both within and between countries, were also a 
hallmark of recovery from the global financial crisis, but these issues may well become even 
more significant as some parts of the world, Europe, some US states and cities, focus more on 
sustainable change, whilst others cannot afford, or will not be politically incentivised, to do so. 
Clearly, it will be critical to see what happens in the major economies, China, the US and the 
EU, but as over 90% of future demand growth between now and 2050 lies outside the OECD, 
the road to recovery in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa 
is just as significant. 
The oil price crash that accompanied the pandemic has made clear the need for so the 
so-called ‘Producer Economies’ to finally put themselves on a more sustainable path, 
particularly if a green recovery results in an earlier peak in fossil fuel demand and an 
acceleration of permanent demand destruction. Failure of fossil fuel-dominated economies to 
adapt to such a trajectory will likely result in instability and conflict, both within and between 
states. In this context, there is an urgent need to explore further what these geographical 
diversities mean for the future politics of sustainable energy transitions, whilst not forgetting 
the growing significance of scale and diversity in political responses within countries.
Last, but far from least, there is the matter of publics and political participation. Some 
argue that publics will now be focused on jobs/recovery only, but there are some early 
indications that this is an over-simplification. Thus, it will be important that those policymakers 
tasked with ensuring sustainable transitions appeal to new behaviours, values, and evidence as 
they design recovery packages, alongside reviving some aspects of business-as-usual in the 
economy. It is in this wider societal context that academics can play a critical role in helping 
to understand possible futures, making clear that what is done today can shape those futures in 
a positive way. Rather like the archivist in the film, ‘The Age of Stupid’,2 who in 2055 reflects 
back on why society failed to take the actions necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change, 
we do not want to look back on 2020-21 as a time when we were unable to turn a global health 
crisis into an opportunity to finally put the world on a more sustainable path, both in terms of 
human security and environmental sustainability.
2 Spanner Films, 2009
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